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Before I start: Could I ask you for a favour? We are
trying to find out a bit more about the preferences
of our readers. Please take two minutes and answer
some VERY BRIEF QUESTIONS. Much obliged!
The EU Commission didn’t always have the very best press among friends of the
rule of law and constitutionalism lately, myself included. In the last week, however,
it has made great efforts to correct the impression that it finds other things more
important than democracy, the rule of law and human rights. It has announced that
it will seek to strengthen the Charter of Fundamental Rights and defend democracy
against fake news and election rigging, both profoundly noble endeavours, of
course. We have postponed the latest and penultimate episode of our rule-of-law
podcast for two days in order to be able to talk to the Commissioner for Justice,
DIDIER REYNDERS, about the very latest developments. The other two guests –
KATARINA BARLEY, Vice-President of the European Parliament, and the one and
only LAURENT PECH – have given him quite a run for his money, but the brave
Commissioner’s explanations for the laggard way in which his authority keeps using
its procedural possibilities before the European Court of Justice against what is
happening in Poland and Hungary still remained somewhat unsatisfactory, from
what I can tell. Reynders himself is not the problem, I dare say, nor is Vice President
Vera Jourová. Both, it seems to me, are doing what they can. The problem is located
further up. And it bears a German name.
At first glance, phonetically, one might even think it’s Dutch, but that would not only
be ignorant, but downright unfair: the Dutch parliament has adopted a resolution
at the beginning of the week, with 124 of 149 votes, that Mark Rutte’s government
should no longer wait for the Commission but take matters into its own hands
and take Poland to court itself. A member state can do this under Art. 259 TFEU,
but that almost never happens. For good reason, as the Member States, relying
on diplomatic cooperation amongst each other, have installed an independent
Commission in Brussels to do this job for them. If the Commission is unwilling or
unable to do it, however, there is still another perfectly legal way to go, and that is
Art. 259 TFEU.
The Netherlands, more precisely the University of Groningen, is the place
where Dimitry Kochenov teaches, who spelled out a few years ago in a much
recommended paper how useful Art. 259 TFEU could be in protecting the Union’s
fundamental values enshrined in Art. 2 TEU, if one so wished. Now someone does.
It will be exciting to watch what will become of this. (As opposed to the humbug the
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Polish Minister of Justice Zbigniew Ziobro is now putting up in reaction to the Dutch
resolution.)
++++++++++Advertisement++++++++
Online Conference I 9 December 2020 I 10.00 a.m. to 5.30 p.m.
70 Years of the European Convention on Human Rights
Safeguarding Human Rights in Germany and Europe
How can the rule of law and the safeguarding of human rights in Germany and
Europe be secured and strengthened in the face of current challenges? This will
be discussed on 9 December by panellists including Federal Minister of Justice
Christine Lambrecht and Federal Foreign Minister Heiko Maas as well as Stephan
Harbarth, President of the Federal Constitutional Court, Marija Pej#inovi# Buri#,
Secretary General of the Council of Europe, and Beate Rudolf, Director of the
German Institute for Human Rights.
Conference languages: German and English (with simultaneous interpreting)
Information on the programme and other panellists can be found at https://70-years-
echr.de
++++++++++++++++++++++
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The Commission has a very broad discretion as to whether or not take a member
state to the ECJ. It’s own democratic legitimacy is seen as somewhat wobbly by
some, which leaves it vulnerable to attempts at the hands of the accused state
to stir up anger against “Brussels bureaucrats” attacking democratically elected
governments. All this is avoided in a procedure under Art. 259. The Commission isn’t
even necessarily sidelined: If a member state sues another for treaty infringement,
it “shall bring the matter before the Commission”, which then can decide to get
involved or not. Either way, the conflict would be negotiated for what it is, namely a
legal disagreement not between EU institutions and member states but within the
Union among member states about what exactly the Union constitution requires of
the members it binds in terms of organizing their justice systems.
Article 7
There are new developments in the other legal channel provided by the treaties to
keep member states from turning authoritarian, as well. This week, Michal Bobek,
Advocate General at the ECJ, presented his opinion in the case of Hungary v.
European Parliament. The Hungarian government had requested that the initiation
of Article 7 proceedings against Hungary by the Parliament in 2018 be annulled.
Unlike in the case of Poland, the Commission had been disinclined to pull article 7
against Hungary for years, until in 2018 the Parliament stepped in and the necessary
majority was reached. Which is what Hungary contests: A two-thirds majority of
votes cast is required (art. 354 TFEU), and, according to Hungary (with Poland
as intervener), the vote failed that threshold – as long as one counts abstentions
as votes cast. But does one? The proposition doesn’t make much sense to the
Advocate General at all: In abstaining, you indicate that you don’t want to cast a vote
and don’t want your vote to be counted. Therefore: complaint unfounded. (“Voting
fraud” was the vocabulary Orbán’s then Foreign Minister found appropriate for this
matter, isn’t that a funny coincidence?)
Even more interesting from a legal point of view is the preceding question: Is this
action even admissible? Did the decision of the Parliament “produce legal effects vis-
à-vis third parties” (art. 263 TFEU), as opposed to being merely a kind of preparatory
act for the final determination by the Council that there is a clear risk of a serious
breach of the Article 2 principles by the Member State (which in turn has only
limited justiciability, art. 269 TFEU). In other words: Was the initiation of Article 7 by
Parliament just an internal procedure with no external relevance but for the (evidently
disinterested) Council, or did it in fact alter the legal situation in some way?
++++++++++Advertisement++++++++
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Virtual fireside chat on Tuesday, 8 December 2020 from 6-8 p.m.
Live streaming here
Three women committed to human rights in high-profile positions share their
personal stories and discuss the position of women in human rights law: A
virtual fireside chat by the Federal Ministry of Justice with the Council of Europe
Commissioner for Human Rights Dunja Mijatoviæ, the former Vice-President of the
European Court of Human Rights Angelika Nußberger and the human rights lawyer
Nani Jansen Reventlow.
++++++++++++++++++++++
Ironically, in order to get its lawsuit admitted, Hungary and Poland had to argue in
the latter sense. Their arguments seem to have convinced the Advocate General
in that respect, at least: The decision of the Parliament may nominally just be
a “proposal” to the Council to state the danger emanating from Hungary in the
way described in art. 7 (1) TEU. Nevertheless, it cannot be compared to a mere
legislative proposal:
A reasoned proposal pursuant to Article 7(1) TEU is a very different
animal. It is not an invitation to negotiate, to collectively deliberate over
the text and its individual provisions, which epitomises the typical back
and forth process of a legislative procedure. A reasoned proposal under
Article 7(1) TEU reflects the final position of its author: the metaphorical
baton in the multistage procedure under Article 7 TEU is passed from one
institution to another. It is the final (and therefore irrevocable) position of
one of the actors in the relay race. The procedure is triggered (and not just
provisionally).
But that is not all: the decision has two more very tangible legal effects: Firstly, with
the initiation of the art. 7 procedure, Hungary loses its status as a safe country of
origin in the asylum procedure. Whoever is politically persecuted in Hungary can
be entitled to protection in Germany under EU law, Hungary’s EU membership
notwithstanding. As an effect of the art. 7 vote in Parliament, the legal fiction that an
EU member state can never be a persecuting state no longer applies.
Secondly:
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The existence of a reasoned proposal may indeed have an impact on
mutual trust and mutual recognition within the area of freedom, security
and justice, in particular, in the context of the execution of European arrest
warrants, but such an impact is certainly not limited to that area of law.
The decision whether to arrest and extradite someone in Germany who is wanted by
a Polish court hinges to a great extent on the art. 7 reasoned proposal. The ECJ has
based its LM ruling largely on the respective proposal of the Commission on Poland.
This, according to the Advocate General, should definitely count as legal effect:
Indeed, in pragmatic terms, the importance of such authoritative statements
coming from a European level can hardly be underestimated. It is unlikely
that a criminal jurisdiction in a Member State, typically a first-instance
criminal court competent to deal with surrender requests, would either have
the capacity or feel competent to carry out a full spectrum review of the
quality of the rule of law in another Member State. Thus, if such actors are
expressly invited to rely on a statement made by the European institutions,
then when it comes to upholding such pronouncements and accepting
the necessary consequences thereof at EU level, which includes allowing
for reasonable access to a court, (…) the once exercised power which
started to have legal effects cannot suddenly disappear in a ‘denial-of-any-
knowledge-mist’, reminding one of ‘The X-Files’ tagline.
The week on Verfassungsblog
When the planned rule-of-law mechanism finally arrives, the Union will have another
powerful instrument at its disposal, which is precisely why Poland and Hungary try to
block it so stubbornly. There is so much more at stake in Poland than just the proper
handling of EU funds. ADAM BODNAR and PAWE# FILIPEK remind the European
institutions of this fact, not least the European Court of Human Rights which has not
yet found the time to deal with the problems in the Polish courts, never mind their
urgency.
The Strasbourg Court did deliver an important judgment on Poland this week, albeit
indirectly and mediated via a distant island in the North Atlantic: In its judgment
Guðmundur Andri Ástráðsson v. Iceland, the ECtHR has defined what constitutes a
“tribunal established by law” under art. 6 of the Human Rights Convention, and the
result, according to HANS PETTER GRAVER, is likely to cause serious issues for
Poland and Hungary.
The disciplinary regime against independent judges in Poland was again discussed
before the ECJ this week. JOHN MORIJN was present at the hearing and reports
how five member states backed the case and increase the pressure on the
Commission to finally become more active in defending the rule of law in Poland.
Could the 25 other member states circumvent the Polish and Hungarian veto
against the “Next Generation Europe” recovery program? After his analysis of
the possibility of “enhanced cooperation” last week (answer: negative), MARTIN
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NETTESHEIM has now taken a closer look at the possibility of a secondary legal
solution. Conclusion: might work legally, but the constitutional costs would be
immense.
++++++++++Advertisement++++++++
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Call for an International Human Rights Law Instructor for the OLIve Program,
Spring Semester 2021
The Open Learning Initiative (OLIve) at Bard College Berlin (BCB) is seeking to
recruit an instructor for the Spring Semester 2021 to design and deliver a 4 US
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credits course on International Human Rights Law. Applications are reviewed on a
rolling basis until Friday, 11 December 2020. For more information, please visit 
https://berlin.bard.edu/about-us/employment/.
++++++++++++++++++++++
In Slovakia, the legislature plans to strip the Constitutional Court of its authority to
review constitutional amendments. ŠIMON DRUGDA explains this case, which is as
interesting in terms of constitutional theory as it is relevant in terms of constitutional
practice, and what lies behind it.
In France, the government’s current security legislation has driven people to protest
en masse, especially the ban on filming the police. KAMEL AJJI examines what this
is all about and why this ban (which even the government has now backed away
from) will not pass constitutional scrutiny.
In Germany, until the beginning of 2016 almost all Syrians were granted subsidiary
protection by the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees. Since then, the
proportion has fallen dramatically and many complaints for supplementary
protection, often by Syrian men who have escaped military service by fleeing, have
not been successful. A new ECJ ruling on protection for Syrian men who have
escaped military service also runs the risk of having little effect in decision-making
practice, reports VALENTIN FENEBERG.
Meanwhile in Thailand, young demonstrators are protesting against the 2017
constitution, while the current government of former junta leader Prayuth Chan-ocha
refuses to offer any concessions. KHEMTHONG TONSAKULRUNGRUANG fears
that this blockade could escalate the protests and bring down the entire government.
In mid-November the conflict between Morocco and Western Sahara escalated after
thirty years of ceasefire. ALINA FUNK finds the role that the EU has taken on in the
region in recent years shows that economic interests count most, and perpetuates
the state of affairs in Western Sahara that is contrary to international law.
In the presidential elections of the Republic of Moldova in mid-November, the pro-
European opposition politician Maia Sandu won a clear victory. She has awakened
great hopes among citizens that she can tackle the many problems in the country.
The difficulty is that as president of a parliamentary democratic system she lacks the
competence to do so. Early parliamentary elections to achieve a political majority are
also unlikely, says MIHAI-RAZVAN CORMAN.
The significant increase in the number of Covid-19 infections has led to a so-
called “partial lockdown” in Germany. However, the federal states have decided
not to close educational institutions temporarily. MICHAEL WRASE considers this
decision to be correct and legally justifiable: The right to education should not just be
a rhetorical figure.
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With the Covid-19 crisis we are – quite literally – at a turning point. So the question
is: Which direction will we take? GERD WINTER offers six observations and possible
lessons to be learnt from the pandemic and applied to environmental policy.
Austria had forgotten most of its coronavirus worries in the summer, and its citizens
had swarmed out to southern and southeastern Europe to enjoy their vacations.
Then, after their return, the number of cases spiked, and the government reacted
abruptly and chaotically. This all culminated in a second, hard lockdown. SUSANNE
GSTÖTTNER and KONRAD LACHMAYER trace the developments and the –
also legal – omissions of the last months, which do not shed a good light on the
government’s crisis management.
In the Glawischnig case, Austria’s Supreme Court has now confirmed that Facebook
must delete the insulting comments against a former Green politician. But does this
really make Austria the “censor of the world”? Hardly, say MATTHIAS KETTEMANN,
GEORG KRAML, FELICITAS RACHINGER and CLARA RAUCHEGGER and clear
up some misunderstandings.
Social media make it more and more difficult for scientists to access data and thus
to conduct independent research. In doing so, platforms perform window-dressing
and refer to their users’ right to data protection and the unclear legal situation
in order to block transparency. AMÉLIE HELDT, MATTHIAS KETTEMANN and
PADDY LEERSSEN explain the status quo and show where regulation could be
effective.
Since its foundation in 2013, the far-right AfD party has proven to be a significant
disruptive factor in the German political system. Most recently, members of the AfD
had helped conspiracy theorists gaining access to the Reichstag, which once again
brought the party into the focus of a debate on party bans. It is important to make
sure that there is more behind the desire to ban the AfD than just an anti-pluralist
affect, says SVEN JÜRGENSEN.
Once again a comedian in Germany is said to have fallen victim to “cancel culture“.
Once again there is great indignation, many see artistic freedom in danger and even
warn of the collapse of democracy. KARSTEN SCHUBERT disagrees with most of
this.
After the threat of an 11-year-old to behead his primary school teacher, there are
again discussions about how teachers should deal with suspicions of “radicalization”.
It is neither clear what is meant by this term, nor are there any legal guidelines on
how the rights and duties of pupils and teachers are to be reconciled. KAJA DELLER
and KONSTANTIN WELKER discuss how regulations could eliminate the existing
uncertainty.
That’s all for this week. Please don’t forget to support us on Steady, by Paypal
(paypal@verfassungsblog.de) or bank transfer (IBAN DE41 1001 0010 0923 7441
03, BIC PBNKDEFF). Many thanks and all the best to you,
Max Steinbeis
- 9 -
- 10 -
